Abstract. In this paper we present a new cryptanalytic technique, based on impossible di erentials, and use it to show that Skipjack reduced from 32 to 31 rounds can be broken by an attack which is faster than exhaustive search.
Introduction
Di erential cryptanalysis 6 traditionally considers characteristics or di erentials with relatively high probabilities and uses them to distinguish the correct unknown keys from the wrong keys. When a correct key is used to decrypt the last few rounds of many pairs of ciphertexts, it is expected that the di erence predicted by the di erential appears frequently, while when a wrong key is used the di erence occurs less frequently. In this paper we describe a new variant of di erential cryptanalysis in which a di erential predicts that particular di erences should not occur i.e., that their probability is exactly zero, and thus the correct key can never decrypt a pair of ciphertexts to that di erence. Therefore, if a pair is decrypted to this di erence under some trial key, then certainly this trial key is not the correct key. This is a sieving attack which nds the correct keys by eliminating all the other keys which lead to contradictions. We call the di erentials with probability zero Impossible di erentials, and this method of cryptanalysis Cryptanalysis with impossible di erentials.
We should emphasize that the idea of using impossible events in cryptanalysis is not new. It is well known 7 that the British cryptanalysis of the German Enigma in world war II used several such ideas for example, a plaintext letter could not be encrypted to itself, and thus an incorrectly guesses plaintext could be easily discarded. The rst application of impossible events in di erential cryptanalysis was mentioned in 6 , where zero entries in the di erence distribution tables were used to discard wrong pairs before the counting phase. A more recent cryptanalytic attack based on impossible events was described by Biham in 1995 in the cryptanalysis of Ladder-DES, a 4-round Feistel cipher using DES as the F function. This cryptanalysis was published in 3 , and was based on the fact that collisions cannot be generated by a p e r m utation. A similar technique was latter used by K n udsen in his description of DEAL 8 , a six-round Feistel cipher using DES as the F function. Although the idea of using impossible events of this type was natural in the context of Feistel ciphers with only a few rounds and with permutations as the round function, there was no general methodology for combining impossible events with di erential cryptanalytic techniques, and for generating impossible di erentials with a large number of rounds. In this paper we show that cryptanalysis with impossible di erentials is very powerful against many ciphers with various structures. We describe an impossible di erential of Skipjack which ensures that for all keys there are no pairs of inputs with particular di erences with the property that after 24 rounds of encryption the outputs have some other particular di erences. This di erential can be used to attack Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds i.e., Skipjack from which only the rst or the last round is removed, slightly faster than exhaustive search, and to distinguish whether a black b o x applies a 24-round variant of Skipjack, or a random permutation. In a related paper 5 we describe the application of this type of cryptanalysis to IDEA 10 and to Khufu 12 , which improves the best known attacks on these schemes. For conventional cryptanalysis of Skipjack with smaller numbers of rounds we refer the reader to 4 and to 9 . The paper is organized as follows: The description of Skipjack is given in Section 2. The 24-round impossible di erential of Skipjack is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe a simple variant of our attack against Skipjack reduced to 25 and to 26 rounds, and in Section 5 we describe our main attack applied against Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss why the attack i s not directly applicable to the full 32-round Skipjack, and summarize the paper. 
Description of Skipjack
Skipjack is an iterated blockcipher with 32 rounds of two t ypes, called Rule A and Rule B. Each round is described in the form of a linear feedback shift register with additional non linear keyed G permutation. Rule B is basically the inverse of Rule A with minor positioning di erences. Skipjack applies eight rounds of Rule A, followed by eight rounds of Rule B, followed by another eight rounds of Rule A, followed by another eight rounds of Rule B. The original de nitions of Rule A and Rule B are given in Figure 1 , where counter is the round number in the range 1 to 32, and where G is a four-round Feistel permutation whose F function is de ned as an 8x8-bit S box, and each round of G is keyed by eight bits of the key. The key scheduling of Skipjack takes a 10-byte key, and uses four of them at a time to key each G permutation. The rst four bytes are used to key the rst G permutation, and each additional G permutation is keyed by the next four bytes cyclically, with a cycle of ve rounds. The description becomes simpler if we unroll the rounds, and keep the four elements in the shift register stationary. 3 A 24-Round Di erential with Probability Zero
We concentrate on the 24 rounds of Skipjack starting from round 5 and ending at round 28 i.e., without the rst four rounds and the last four rounds. For the sake of clarity, w e use the original round numbers of the full Skipjack, i.e., from 5 to 28, rather than from 1 to 24. Given any pair with di erence only in the second word of the input of round 5, i.e., with a di erence of the form 0; a ; 0; 0, the di erence after round 28 cannot be of the form b; 0; 0; 0, for any non-zero a and b. W e are aware of several shorter di erentials with probability zero; this one is the longest known to us. The reason that this di erential has probability zero can be explained as a miss in the middle combination of two 12-round di erentials with probability 1 : As Wagner observed in 16 , the second input word of round 5 does not a ect the fourth word after round 16, and given an input di erence 0; a ; 0; 0 the di erence after 12 rounds is of the form c; d; e; 0 for some non-zero c, d, and e. On the other hand, we can predict the data after round 16 from the output di erence of round 28, i.e., to consider the di erentials in the backward direction. Similarly to the 12-round di erential with probability 1, there is a backward 12-round di erential with probability 1. It has the di erence b; 0; 0; 0 after round 28, and it predicts that the data after round 16 must be of the form f;g;0; h for some non-zero f, g, and h. Combining these two di erentials, we conclude that any pair with di erence 0; a ; 0; 0 after round 4 and di erence b; 0; 0; 0 after round 28 must have di erences of the form c; d; e; 0 = f;g;0; h after round 16 for some non-zero c, d, e, f, g, and h. As e and h are non-zero, we get a contradiction, and thus there cannot be pairs with such di erences after rounds 4 and 28. One application of this di erential may be to distinguish whether an encryption black b o x is a 24-round Skipjack from round 5 to round 28, or a random permutation. Identi cation requires only to feed the black b o x with 2 48 pairs for some with di erences of the form 0; a ; 0; 0, and to verify whether the output di erences are of the form b; 0; 0; 0. If for some pair the output difference is of the form b; 0; 0; 0, the black box certainly does not apply this variant of Skipjack. On the other hand, if the black b o x implements a random permutation, there is only a probability o f e , that none of the 2 48 pairs has a di erence b; 0; 0; 0. For example, given 2 52 pairs the probability of the black box to be incorrectly identi ed as this variant of Skipjack is only e ,16 10 ,7 .
These pairs can be packed e ciently using structures of 2 16 plaintexts which form 2 31 pairs. In these structures all the plaintexts are equal except for the second word which ranges over all the possible 2 16 values. Using these structures, the same distinguishing results can be reached using only 2 33 encryptions.
Attack on Skipjack Reduced to 25-26 Rounds
In this section we describe the simplest cryptanalysis of Skipjack v ariants, with only one or two additional rounds on top of the 24-round impossible di erential itself. An attack on a 25-round variant of Skipjack from round 5 to round 29 is as follows. Choose structures of 2 16 plaintexts which di er only at their second word, having all the possible values in it. Such structures propose about 2 31 pairs of plaintexts. Given 2 22 such structures 2 38 plaintexts, collect all those pairs which di er only at the rst two w ords of the ciphertexts; by the structure of Skipjack, only these pairs may result from pairs with a di erence b; 0; 0; 0 after round 28. On average only half of the structures propose such pairs, and thus only about 2 21 pairs remain. Denote the ciphertexts of such a pair by C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; C 4 and C A s w e know that such a di erence is impossible, every key that proposes such a di erence is a wrong key. F or each pair we try all the 2 32 possible values of the subkey of the last round, and verify whether the decrypted values by the last G permutation have the di erence C 0 2 this process can be done e ciently in about 2 16 steps. It is expected that about 2 16 values propose this di erence, and thus we are guaranteed that these 2 16 values are not the correct subkey of the last round. After analyzing the 2 21 pairs, there remain only about 2 32 1,2 ,16 2 21 = 2 32 e ,32 2 ,14 wrong values of the subkey of the last round. It is thus expected that only one value remains, and this value must be the correct subkey. The time complexity of recovering this last 32-bit subkey is about 2 17 2 21 = 2 38 G permutation computations. Since each encryption consists of about 2 5 applications of G, this time complexity is equivalent to about 2 33 encryptions. A straightforward implementation of the attack requires an array o f 2 32 bits to keep the information of the already identi ed wrong keys. A more e cient implementation requires only about 2 32 G computations on average, which i s a b o u t 2 27 encryptions, and using 2 16 bits of memory. Essentially the same attack w orks against a 26-round variant from round 4 to round 29. In this variant, the same subkey is used in the rst and last rounds. The attack is as follows: Choose 2 6 structures of 2 32 plaintexts which di er only in the rst two words and get all the 2 32 values of these two w ords. Find the pairs which di er only in the rst two w ords of the ciphertexts. It is expected that about 2 6 2 63 =2 32 = 2 37 pairs remain. Each of these pairs propose one wrong subkey value on average, and thus with a high probability after analysis of all the pairs only the correct rst last subkey remains. The time complexity of this attack when done e ciently is 2 48 , using an array o f 2 16 bits. The rest of the key bits can be found by exhaustive search o f 2 48 keys.
Cryptanalysis of Skipjack Reduced to 31 Rounds
For the cryptanalysis of Skipjack reduced to 31 rounds, we use again the 24-round impossible di erential. We rst analyze the variant consisting of the rst 31 rounds of Skipjack, and then the variant consisting of the last 31 rounds of Skipjack. Before we describe the full details of the attack, we wish to emphasize several delicate points. We observe that the full 80-bit key is used in the rst four rounds before the di erential, and is also used in the last three rounds after the di erential. Therefore, the key-elimination process should discard 80-bit candidate keys. Assuming that the veri cation of each of the 2 80 keys costs at least one G computation, and as one G computation is about 31 times faster than one encryption, we end up with an attack whose time complexity is at least 2 80 =31 2 75 encryptions. This lower bound is only marginally smaller than exhaustive search, and therefore the attack cannot spend more than a few G operations verifying each k ey, and cannot try each k ey more than a few times. We next observe that if the impossible di erential holds in some pair, then the third word of the plaintexts and the third and fourth words of the ciphertexts have zero di erences, and the other words have non-zero di erences. Given a pair with such di erences, and assuming that the di erential holds, we get three 16-bit restrictions in rounds 1, 4, and 29. Therefore, we expect that a fraction of 2 ,48 of the keys, i.e., about 2 32 keys, encrypt the plaintext pair to the input di erence of the di erential after round 4, and decrypt the ciphertext pair to the output di erence of the di erential before round 29. Once veri ed, these keys are discarded. These 2 32 keys must be discarded with complexity no higher than 2 32 as we mentioned earlier. Thus, we cannot try all the 2 80 keys for each pair, but rather, we devise an e cient algorithm to compute the 2 32 keys. The general structure of the attack is thus expected to be as follows: we generate a large structure of chosen plaintexts and select the pairs satisfying the required di erences. We analyze these pairs, and each o f them discards about 2 32 keys. After the analysis of 2 48 pairs, about 2 80 not necessarily distinct keys are discarded. We expect that due to collisions, about 1=e of the keys remain undiscarded. The analysis of additional pairs decreases the number of undiscarded keys, until after about 2 48 ln 2 80 2 48 2 6 pairs only the correct key remains. However, the complexity of such an attack is higher than the complexity of exhaustive search. Therefore, we analyze only 2 49 pairs, leaving about 2 80 =e 2 2 77 keys undiscarded, and then try the remaining keys exhaustively. W e emphasize that the analysis discards keys which cause partial encryption and decryption of a valid pair to match the form of the impossible di erential. We thus assume in the attack that the di erences proposed by the impossible di erential do hold, and discard all keys which con rm this false assumption. We are now ready to describe the attack. We choose 2 41 plaintexts whose third words are equal. Given the ciphertexts, we sort or hash them by their third and fourth words, and select pairs which collide at these words. It is expected that about 2 41 2 =2 2 32 = 2 49 pairs are selected. Each selected pair is subjected to the following analysis, consisting of four phases.
In the rst phase we analyze the rst round. We know the two inputs of the G permutation, and its output di erence. This G permutation is keyed by 32 bits, and there are about 2 16 of the possible subkeys that cause the expected di erence. This can be done in 2 16 steps, by guessing the rst two bytes of the subkeys, and computing the other two bytes by di erential cryptanalytic techniques. As the subkeys of the rst and last rounds are the same, we can peel o the last round for each of the possible subkeys. We then analyze round 4. We know the input and output di erences of the G permutation in round 4. Due to the complementation properties 4 4 of the G permutation, we can assume that the inputs are xed to some arbitrary pair of values, and nd about 2 16 candidate subkeys corresponding to these values. The complexity of this analysis is 2 16 . We can then complete all the possible combinations of inputs and subkeys using the complementation properties. The analysis of round 29 is similar. We now observe that the same subkey is used in round 4 and in round 29. The possible subkeys of rounds 4 and 29 are kept e ciently by using the complementation property, and thus we cannot directly search for two equal subkey values. Instead, we observe that the XOR value of the rst two subkey bytes with the other two subkey bytes is independent o f complementation, and we use this XOR value as the common value which is used to join the two lists of subkeys of both rounds. By a proper complementation we get a list of about 2 16 tuples of the subkey, the input of round 4 and the output of round 29. The complexity of this analysis is about 2 16 steps. This list can still be subjected to the complementation property to get all the about 2 32 possible combinations. The third phase joins the two lists, into a list of about 2 32 entries of the form cv 0 ; : : : ; c v 5 ; X 3 ; X 30 where cv 0 ; : : : ; c v 5 are the six key bytes used in rounds 1, 4, and 29, X 3 is the feedback of the XOR operation in round 3 i.e., the output of the third G permutation, X 30 is the feedback in round 30 i.e., the input of the 30'th G permutation, which i s t h e same in both members of the pair if cv 0 ; : : : ; c v 5 are correct. For each of these values we can now encrypt the rst half of round 2 using cv 4 and cv 5 and decrypt the second half of round 3 using X 3 , cv 0 , and cv 1 . We can view the second half of round 2 and the rst half of round 3 as one permutation, which w e call G', which has an additional feedback the third plaintext word in its middle. We are left now with only two equalities involving cv 6 ; : : : ; c v 9 which should hold, as we know the input and output of round 30, and we know the two outputs of G'. There is only one solution of cv 6 ; : : : ; c v 9 on average, and given the solution we nd a key which encrypts the plaintexts to the input di erence of the impossible di erential after round 4, and decrypts the ciphertexts to the impossible di erence before round 29. Therefore, we nd a key which is certainly wrong, and thus should be discarded. In total we nd about 2 32 such keys during the analysis of each pair. By analyzing 2 49 pairs selected from the 2 41 chosen plaintexts, we nd a total of 2 49 2 32 = 2 81 keys, but some of them are found more than once. It is expected that a fraction of 1,2 ,80 2 81 = 1 =e 2 1=8 of the keys are not discarded. These keys are then tested by trial encryptions in the fourth phase. To complete the description of the attack w e should describe two delicate im- plementation details: The rst detail describes how to nd the subkey cv 6 ; : : : ; c v 9 using one table lookup. The inputs and outputs of G and G' consist of 80 bits, and for each choice of the 80-bit query there is on average only one solution for the subkey. Therefore, we could keep a table of 2 80 entries, each storing the solutions for a speci c query. But the size of this table and the time of its precomputation are larger than the complexities we can a ord. Instead, we observe that the complementation property o f the G permutation 4 enables us to x one of the input words say to zero by X ORing the other input, the two outputs, and the proposed subkeys excluding the intermediate feedback of G' by the original value of this input. We can, therefore, reduce the size of the table to 2 64 , and the precomputation time to 2 64 as well. Each e n try of the table contains on average one 32-bit subkey. The size of the table can be halved by k eeping only the rst 16 bits of the subkey, observing that the second half can then be easily computed given the rst half. The second delicate implementation detail is related to the way we keep the list of discarded keys. The simplest way is to keep the list in a table of 2 80 binary entries whose values are initialized to 0, and are set to 1 when the corresponding keys are discarded. But again, this table is too large although its initialization and update times are still considerably faster than the rest of the attack. Instead, we observe that we can perform the attack iteratively while caching the results of phase 2, where in each iteration we analyze only the keys whose rst two bytes cv 0 and cv 1 are xed to the index of the iteration. This modi cation can be performed easily as the attack guesses these two b ytes in its rst phase, and each guess leads to independent computations. We t h us perform exactly the same attack with a di erent order of instructions. As the rst 16 bits of the keys are now xed in each iteration, the number of required entries in the table is reduced to 2 64 .
The complexities of phases 1 and 2 are about 2 16 for each pair, and 2 49 2 16 = 2 65 in total for all the pairs. The complexity of phase 3 is as follows: For each pair, and for each v alue in the joined list, we compute two halves of a G permutation and solve for cv 6 ; : : : ; c v 9 given the inputs and outputs of the third G and of G'. Assuming that this solution costs about one computation of a G p e r m utation, the total complexity of phase 3 is 2 49 2 32 2 1 2 + 1 = 2 82 computations of a G permutation, which is equivalent t o 2 82 =31 2 77 encryptions. The complexity of phase 4 is about 2 80 =8 = 2 77 encryption. Therefore, the total complexity o f the attack i s a b o u t 2 78 encryptions, which is four times faster than exhaustive search. The average time complexity of the attack is about 2 77 , which is also four times faster than the average case of exhaustive search. An attack on the reduced variant consisting of rounds 2 to 32 requires fewer chosen plaintexts, and the same complexity. Given four structures of 2 32 chosen plaintexts with words 3 and 4 xed, we can select the 42 32 2 =2 attack against the variant consisting of rounds 1 to 31 using 2 34 chosen ciphertext blocks.
Discussion and Conclusions
The best complexities of our attack when applied to reduced-round variants of Skipjack are summarized in Table 1 . This attack cannot be directly used against the full 32 rounds of Skipjack because each pair may discard only about 2 16 keys. However, the analysis of phases 1 and 2 which in the case of the full Skipjack also includes the analysis of the last round cannot be reduced below 2 32 G computations. Therefore, the complexity of the attack is lower bounded by 2 16 =32 = 2 11 times the number of discarded keys instead of being a few times smaller than the number of discarded keys, and thus the time required to eliminate all but the correct key is longer than exhaustive search. Note that the above attacks against Skipjack are independent of the choice of the G permutation or the F table. Also note that if in addition to the 5-round cycle of the key schedule, Skipjack had 5-round groups of rules instead of 8-round groups of rules, i.e., had consecutive groups of ve rounds of Rule A followed by ve rounds of Rule B, followed by ve Rule A and ve Rule B rounds, etc, then it would have a 27-round impossible di erential. We are aware of several impossible di erentials of various blockciphers, such as a 7-round impossible di erential of Feal 15,13 , 5-round impossible di erential of DES 14 , 20-round impossible di erential of CAST-256 1 , 18-round impossible di erential of Khufu 12 , and 2.5-round impossible di erential of IDEA 10 . In a related paper 5 w e use these impossible di erentials to cryptanalyze IDEA with up to 4.5 rounds, and to cryptanalyze Khufu with up to 20 rounds. Both attacks analyze more rounds than any other published attack against these ciphers. There are many modi cations and extensions of the ideas presented in this paper. For example, cryptanalysis with impossible di erentials can be used with low-probability rather than zero-probability di erentials, can be used with conditional characteristics 2 or di erentials, and can be combined with linear 11 rather than di erential cryptanalysis. Designers of new blockciphers try to show that their schemes are resistant to di erential cryptanalysis by providing an upper bound on the probability o f characteristics and di erentials in their schemes. One of the interesting consequences of the new attack is that even a rigorously proven upper bound of this type is insu cient, and that designers also have to consider lower bounds in order to prove resistance against attacks based on impossible or low-probability di erential properties.
